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Gored by a Cornucopia: The Risks to Climate 
Change From Laws and Policies That Incentivize 
Competitive But Divergent Energy Innovations 
Roy Andrew Partain∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) is the leading international regulatory effort to 
reduce the threats and hazards from anthropogenic climate change. 
The UNFCCC primarily focuses on the means of managing the 
overall levels of greenhouse gas emissions released into the 
atmosphere and the means of preventing those emissions. Almost 
every country in the world has ratified the UNFCCC,1 and almost as 
many countries have ratified its Kyoto Protocol.2 As such, most 
countries in the world have enacted a variety of domestic regulations 
to further the goals of the UNFCCC to control and prevent global 
climate change. 
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol establish certain policy 
goals to coordinate global efforts to reduce the impact of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. However, concerns have 
arisen in the recent decades regarding UNFCCC policy failure; 
questions have arisen as to whether certain green policies could 
backfire and result in increased greenhouse gas emissions. These 
concerns are called green paradoxes.3 Broadly summarized, the 
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 1. 195 countries have ratified the UNFCCC as of March 24, 2014; contrast 
that total against the 193 members of the United Nations. See First steps to a 
safer future: Introducing The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. UNFCCC (Jan. 11, 2015, 7:00 PM), https://unfccc.int/essential 
_background/convention/items/6036.php, archived at https://perma.cc/544L-
2QC3 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015); See also Member States of the United Nations 
UN (Jan. 11, 2015, 7:00 PM), http://www.un.org/en/members/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/JT8Z-2E2V. 
 2. 192 nations and regional organizations have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. See 
Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNFCCC (Jan. 11, 2015, 7:08 PM), 
https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php, archived at 
https://perma.cc/D63G-C7RT. 
 3. A variety of models have found that under specific circumstances, green 
paradox results might be obtained. While there are other potential causes of green 
paradox phenomena, most of the models rely on nuanced economic models that 
assume some sort of policy implementation delay or failure combined with certain 
behavioral assumptions on fossil fuel producers. A literature review of green 
paradox research is provided at Roy A. Partain, Climate Change, Green Paradox 
Models, and International Trade Laws, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE 




concern is that asynchronous implementation of climate change 
policies across multiple jurisdictions could be dysfunctional; these 
sets of problems were originally known as carbon leakage problems. 
A similar concern arose in review of proposed rising carbon taxes;4 
under certain circumstances, temporal issues in green climate policy 
implementation could lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions.5 
The combination of diverse energy policies could lead to 
increased energy supplies that, when combined with international 
trade laws that notably support primary product exports such as 
fossil fuels, could encourage increased emissions of greenhouse 
gases. Ergo, if the present legal measures are left as-is, there is a 
foreseeable risk that the hazards from anthropogenic climate 
change could be worsened by higher levels of emissions, even if 
green energy laws were successful in stimulating green energy 
innovation. 
This article investigates a complementary line of research: 
whether naïve implementation of the UNFCCC regulatory goals to 
provide innovation in new and renewable energy sources, sans 
complementary coordination with other measures to provide 
innovations in other energy technologies, could result in increased 
greenhouse gas emissions. This article finds that such an 
implementation could indeed result in increased greenhouse gas 
emissions;6 while some of the measures support innovation in green 
energy sources, other legal measures support innovation in fossil 
fuels. 
Part I analyzes the UNFCCC and its associated agreements 
such as the Kyoto Protocol. The analysis presented suggests that 
such international conventions created to limit the risks of 
anthropogenic climate change do drive innovation in new and 
                                                                                                             
 
CHANGE AND TRADE LAW (Panagiotis Delimatsis, ed. forthcoming 2015) 
[hereinafter Partain, Climate Change]. For a critical review of the mathematical 
structures underlying most green paradox models, see also Roy A. Partain, Is a 
Green Paradox Spectre Haunting International Climate Change Laws and 
Conventions? 33 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2014) [hereinafter Partain, Green 
Paradox Spectre]. 
 4. This example was the seminal green paradox example proposed by Sinn. 
See Hans-Werner Sinn, Public Policies against Global Warming, 15 INT’L TAX 
PUB. FIN. 360, 360 (2008). 
 5. A rising tax rate is mathematically similar to a delayed higher tax rate and 
is thus analog to asynchronous implementation of the climate change policies 
across multiple countries. See Partain, Climate Change, supra note 3. See also the 
more detailed discussion in Partain, Green Paradox Spectre, supra note 3. 
 6. Albeit, these results are differentiable from international carbon leakage 
or conventional green paradoxes in that the model focuses on the simultaneous 
application of divergent legal measures. 




renewable energy supplies. Such innovations are intended to 
provide increased volumes of energy supplies at affordable prices 
in order to displace carbon-emitting energy supplies, thus 
preventing anthropogenic sources of climate risk. However, the 
key conclusion is that these legal efforts would increase energy 
supplies if successful. 
Part II inspects select international agreements and concludes 
that these particular agreements sustain or encourage the 
development of fossil fuels, including petroleum, coal, and natural 
gas. Part III examines the role of energy security laws, i.e., those 
laws that support the secure supply of energy resources against 
adverse conditions, in driving innovation in energy. Such targets 
might include securing petroleum volumes or energy alternatives, 
such as nuclear energy. Motives for energy security laws might be to 
protect energy prices from market forces or to support militarized 
forces. Part III looks to laws of the United States as an example. 
Part IV considers the role of various international trade 
conventions in supporting market conditions and free competition 
conditions. This article will examine the WTO/GATT system of 
agreements and reveal their support of open trade and competitive 
market conditions. Part V integrates the previous four Parts into a 
finding of a potential green paradox event: The combined results of 
multiple legal policies to encourage energy innovations could result 
in increased energy supplies that would price compete, potentially 
resulting in increased greenhouse gas emissions, ergo, a green 
paradox. Finally, this article concludes by evaluating the steps that 
could be taken to de-bug the scenario. 
I.UNFCCC DRIVES INNOVATION IN NEW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY 
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol provide the foundation 
for modern legal institutions to mitigate, prevent, and reduce the 
hazards from anthropogenic climate change. While the Protocol 
updates and modifies the UNFCCC, the difference is evolutionary 
not revolutionary. It is important to review the two set of documents 
separately, however, because Canada and the United States are not 
currently parties to the Kyoto Protocol.7 Key among these efforts is 
the UNFCCC.8 The UNFCCC provided a broad framework to 
                                                                                                             
 7. An additional document, the Doha Amendment, has been proposed but not 
widely adopted at the current time. Currently, negotiations are underway to extend 
the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2015. See Status of the Doha Amendment, UNFCCC, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php, archived at 
http://perma.cc/X7NR-FW2F (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). 
 8. The preliminary efforts began much earlier, with the first World Climate 
Conference (WCC) having convened in 1979. That meeting ultimately led to the 




establish a global means of coordinating regional and domestic 
efforts to curb and mitigate the potential harms of climate change. 
While the UNFCCC was a sound start, it lacked economic 
incentives and emissions controlling obligations to achieve its climate 
change policy goals; the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 was developed to 
provide those missing tools.9 The Kyoto Protocol established specific 
obligations for its signatories to reach certain emission targets; it also 
enabled certain private market methods to coordinate carbon emission 
reduction plans across actors and jurisdictions.10 The UNFCCC and 
the Kyoto Protocol have continued to evolve through the Marrakesh 
Accords of 2001, the 2005 Nairobi Work Program on Adaption, the 
2007 Bali Road Map, the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, the 2010 
Cancun Agreements, the 2011 Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, 
the 2012 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, and most recently 
the 2013 Warsaw Outcomes. Thus, from the initial conference in 
1979 to the most recent rounds in Warsaw, the development of 
climate change policy and carbon emission controls has taken decades 
to develop, yet it remains a framework with very little power to 
enforce emission limits. 
The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol provide a framework for 
addressing climate change, but domestic enactment of local laws is 
required to make the agenda functional. Some countries and 
regions have developed elaborate regulatory frameworks to 
coordinate with the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocols, while other 
nations developed frameworks disconnected from the UNFCCC 
and Kyoto Protocols, and still other nations have not made 
substantial efforts to mitigate carbon emissions. 
There are countries and regional areas that coordinate within the 
obligations of the UNFCCC. For instance, the European Union (EU) 
                                                                                                             
 
formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which 
provides the scientific community with a means to colloborate and present 
consensus on scientific findings related to climate change to the United Nations and 
its Members. 
 9. “[T]he Kyoto Protocol is what ‘operationalizes’ the Convention. It commits 
industrialized countries to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions based on the principles 
of the Convention. The Convention itself only encourages countries to do so.” 
Making those first steps count: An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol, UNFCCC 
(Jan. 11, 2014, 7:21 PM), https://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol 
/items/6034.php, archived at https://perma.cc/UZW8-8627. 
 10. E.g., see the ‘joint commitments’ under art. 4(1), the ‘clean development 
mechanism’ under art. 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, and the ‘coordination of measures’ 
under art. 13(4)(d). Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/ Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 
(1998). 
 




and its Member States have created legislation at both the EU and 
Member State levels to comply with the UNFCCC. The EU 
legislation has become a template for other countries. Similar 
enactments have been adopted in both South Korea and Japan. On 
the other hand, the United States is among those countries that have 
put in place a variety of emission controls without legal reference to 
the obligations of the Kyoto Protocol. The United States signed and 
ratified the UNFCCC, but it has not done similarly for the Kyoto 
Protocol. However, the United States has put into place a wide range 
of energy efficiency requirements, emissions controls, and other 
public campaigns to reduce the causes of anthropogenic climate 
change. Nonetheless, the point is made that the EU methods and the 
American methods are materially different in manners that might 
impact consumer or producer decisions. Finally, there are those 
countries that either have no effective regulations to follow the 
guidelines of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol or lack the 
enforcement capabilities to ensure the operation of their UNFCCC 
compliant regulations. 
This patchwork of legal regimes has left carbon emissions and 
climate change regulatory development uneven and inconsistent on a 
global scale. To further exacerbate potential frustrations, the various 
regimes have been enacted with equally disjoint time frames; the laws 
were not harmoniously or simultaneously enacted, and nor have they 
drifted in unison towards more uniformity. 
Thus, while the need for the halting of anthropogenic climate 
change is broadly understood, global efforts have lacked both 
coordination and consistent enforcement. As such, there are concerns 
that certain forms of policy implementation might accidentally enable 
greater, not fewer, greenhouse gas emissions. 
A. Technology for Climate Change Mitigation 
The objective of the UNFCCC is the “stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”11 
Greenhouse gases are defined by their behavior, as gaseous 
constituents of the atmosphere that absorb and re-emit infrared 
radiation, regardless of source;12 the only per se greenhouse 
                                                                                                             
 11. UNFCCC, Art. 2. While both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol have 
extensive language on the support of climate science and scientific monitoring, these 
topics do not appear to have substantial bearing on the green paradox concerns, so 
they have been omitted from the current review framework. 
 12. UNFCCC, art. 4. sec. 5. 




mentioned in the UNFCCC is carbon dioxide.13 The Kyoto Protocol 
improves on the UNFCCC’s definition of greenhouse gases by 
providing a list of per se greenhouse gases: (i) carbon dioxide, (ii) 
methane, (iii) nitrous oxide, (iv) hydrofluorocabons, (v) 
perfluorocarbons, and (vi) sulphur hexafluoride.14 The Doha 
Amendment added nitrogen trifluoride to that listing.15 
The UNFCCC requires the Parties to “formulate, implement, 
publish, and regularly update . . . programmes containing measures to 
mitigate climate change.”16 Those measures are required to focus on 
reducing emissions of and providing sinks for greenhouse gases.17 
The Kyoto Protocol spelled out specific obligatory mitigation 
strategies.18 Parties are to: 
i. Enhance energy efficiency;19 
ii. Provide for greenhouse gas sinks and carbon 
sequestration;20 
iii. Research, promote, develop and increase the use of new 
and renewable energy sources;21 
iv. Reduce the various supports and subsidies that enable 
greenhouse gas emissions, such as tax breaks for 
crude oil production; and22 
v. Limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions including 
methane emissions.23 
Technological innovations are required to accomplish energy 
efficiency goals, the development of greenhouse sinks and carbon 
sequestration, and the potential development of new and renewable 
energy sources. 
                                                                                                             
 13. See “[A]nthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases . . . ” UNFCCC, art. 4, sec. 2(a). 
 14. Kyoto Protocol, Annex A. List of Greenhouse Gases, http://unfccc.int/kyoto 
_protocol/items/3145.php, archived at http://perma.cc/JTE6-NE42 (last visited Mar. 
13, 2015). 
 15. Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, art. 1, sec. B. 
 16. UNFCCC, art. 4, sec. 1(b). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Kyoto Protocol, art. 2, sec. 1(a). 
 19. Id. at sec. 1(a)(i). 
 20. Id. at sec. 1(a)(ii) and (iv). 
 21. Id. at sec. 1(a)(iv). 
 22. Id. at sec. 1(a)(v). This concerns the green paradox research directly in that 
by reducing the tax credits or deductions available to energy producers the 
requirement effectively requires a net increase on carbon-related taxes. Depending 
on how those changes are implemented, they could fit well within established areas 
of green paradox concerns. 
 23. Kyoto Protocol, art. 2, sec. 1(a)(vii)−(viii). 




Further, the Kyoto Protocol mandates that certain emission 
targets be reached by specific deadlines—an element that is absent 
in the UNFCCC.24 
B. Technology Transfer 
The Parties to the UNFCCC are required to develop, apply, and 
transfer the technologies that can enable them to meet the prior 
requirements to manage greenhouse gases.25 Developed Parties have 
specific historical advantages, and thus have the duty to support 
Developing Parties in accomplishing their obligations and the broader 
goals of climate change mitigation.26 The Annex II Parties are to 
provide financial resources to better enable the Developing Parties 
acquire and implement climate change mitigation technologies; this 
includes “all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance.”27 
Similar requirements are found within the Kyoto Protocol.28 
The Kyoto Protocol has several mechanisms to better ensure the 
transfer of climate change abatement technologies. The first among 
these is the “financial mechanism.”29 The financial mechanism 
enables the transfer of funds from Developed Parties to Developing 
Parties to finance the acquisition and operation of green technologies. 
An example of the financial mechanism is the Green Climate Fund to 
be operated from Incheon, South Korea. Second, the Kyoto Protocol 
calls for a “clean development mechanism,” which would enable 
Developed Parties to engage in green climate projects in a 
Developing Party’s jurisdiction and enable both parties to benefit 
from the generation of emission accounting rules.30 Finally, the Kyoto 
Protocol enables emission account unit trading in order for Parties to 
pursue economically efficient pathways of mitigating climate 
change.31 Thus, the ultimate diffusion of climate change abetting 
                                                                                                             
 24. Id. at art. 3, sec. 1. The targets are to be attained by 2012. The Doha 
Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol would extend that timeline to 2020 and deepen 
the emission cuts to be achieved. See Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, art. 1, 
C, “Article 2, paragraph 1 bis.” 
 25. UNFCCC, art. 4, sec. 1(c). 
 26. This is a consistent sustainable development principle applied throughout 
both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. See UNFCCC, art. 3, sec. 1 and 2. See 
generally UNFCCC, art. 4, sec. 2. See also UNFCCC art. 4, sec. 2(1) (noting that 
Developed Countries need to demonstrate that they are taking the lead in mitigating 
climate change). 
 27. UNFCCC, art. 4, sec. 3, 5. 
 28. See Kyoto Protocol, art. 10. 
 29. Id. at art. 11, sec. 2. 
 30. Id. at art. 12. 
 31. Id. at art. 6. 




technologies is mandated by the Kyoto Protocol and economically 
supported by its Parties. 
A third mechanism is the “technology mechanism.” At the 
Conference of the Parties in Doha, Qatar 2012, Decision 14/CP.18 
authorized the implementation and initiation of the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network under the United Nations 
Environment Programme; this action followed from Decision 
1/CP.16.32 Thus, the technology mechanism is now operational. 
C. Common but Differentiated Obligations 
While all Parties remain obligated to the obligations of the 
Convention, Developing Parties are permitted certain differences in 
implementation from the Developed Parties. This issue plays a 
substantial role in when and how emission targets might be 
achieved; indeed, as discussed later in this article, the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has taken a very specific 
stand on this issue in particular. 
Developing Parties are allowed to set their standards with 
reference to the attainment efforts of the Developed Parties.33 
Economies in transition are given wider berth.34 A variety of 
countries are given pre-emptive understanding to their special needs 
and concerns; included on the list are countries that will be 
especially harmed by climate change and countries that rely heavily 
on revenues from fossil fuels and energy-intensive products.35 
Additionally, the Framework Convention recognizes that the Least 
Developed Parties will need specific forms of assistance.36 
The UNFCCC has approximately 200 Parties, but certain Annex 
I and II Parties bear more burdens than other Parties. Annex I Parties 
are primarily European countries plus Russia, Japan, the United 
States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Annex II is the same 
list minus the parties who were formerly a part of the Soviet Union. 
Annex II is de facto a list of Developed Parties, who are held 
financially responsible for assisting Developing Parties. Annex I 
Parties assumed obligations to adopt national policies to mitigate 
climate change.37 Additionally, Annex I Parties are also required to 
coordinate economic and administrative policies with each other to 
                                                                                                             
 32. Conference of the Parties, Report of the Conerence of the Parties on its 
eighteenth session, held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012, FCCC 
/CP/2012/8/Add.2 (Nov. 26 to Dec. 8, 2012). 
 33. UNFCCC, art. 4, sec. 7. 
 34. Id. at sec. 6. 
 35. Id. at sec. 8. See Sec. 8(h). 
 36. Id. at sec. 9. 
 37. Id. at sec. 2(a). 




enable climate change mitigation.38 The rest of the Parties, 
especially those Developing Parties, are not explicitly obligated to 
specifically pursue the same obligations. 
Also, while the Kyoto Protocol calls for “[m]easures to limit 
and/or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases,”39 only those counties 
listed as Annex B have commitments to specific emission 
reductions.40 All other countries merely need to enact measures that in 
some form could be said to limit or reduce emissions. In such cases, 
legislation to promote new and renewable energy or legislation to 
promote energy efficiency might suffice. 
D. UNFCCC Requires and Supports Energy Innovation 
Thus, the basic policy obligations of the UNFCCC and related 
legal efforts can be summarized: 
1. To reduce the emission of greenhouse gases by several 
means: 
a. Energy Efficiency; 
b. Enhancements of sinks and reservoirs and carbon 
sequestration; 
c. Development and promotion of new and renewable 
forms of energy; 
d. Elimination of supports and subsidies for activities 
that enable greenhouse gas emissions; and 
e. Prevention of methane venting from various 
activities; 
2. To provide means, both legal and financial, to ensure all 
nations can undertake obligations under the UNFCCC; 
3. To provide for broad technology transfer, including 
intellectual property; and 
4. To provide for the transboundary coordination of the 
above efforts. 
The role of both technology and innovations in energy 
technology to provide the solution is self-evident from the listing. 
The necessary energy technologies, and thus the needed alternative 
energy supplies, are not yet in hand, so the Convention called for the 
support of their development and promotion and the facilitation of 
their adoption by all Parties. This was a broad request of scientific 
                                                                                                             
 38. Id. at sec. 2(e)(i). 
 39. Kyoto Protocol, art. 2 , sec. 1(a)(vii). 
 40. Kyoto Protocol, Annex B. Also, Annex B’s list of countries has seen 
some variation of included countries since its enactment. 




resources, financial capabilities, and legal coordination between the 
Parties. 
While political discourse has not yet solved the issues of reducing 
subsidies to carbon fuels and effective reductions in emissions, it is 
clear that all Parties otherwise strongly support the development of 
green energy technologies.41 Given the commitment of the Parties to 
the positive development of the technologies underlying this call, it 
would be reasonable to expect green and renewable technologies to 
provide more energy supplies in the future. 
II. ENERGY TRADE LAWS DRIVE INNOVATION IN ENERGY, MOSTLY 
IN FOSSIL FUELS 
This section examines two international trade agreements that 
encourage, inter alia, innovation in energy technologies. However, 
contrary to the intent of the UNFCCC, these legal efforts attempt 
to secure the future of petroleum and other fossil fuels. While both 
efforts do acknowledge their recognition and support of the 
UNFCCC, they remain steadfastly committed to protecting and 
promoting the commercial feasibility of carbon-based fuels to 
compete alongside renewable energy resources. 
The first agreement is the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) that 
originally was intended to facilitate the interchange of energy 
products and investments between Europe and countries emerging 
from a Soviet era. The second agreement is OPEC, the collective of 
certain major petroleum producing countries. Both of these 
arrangements are primarily, if not exclusively, focused on petroleum 
and natural gas. Both of them also require their Contracting Parties 
or Member States to provide for research and development to secure 
future fossil fuel supplies at competitive prices. As such, both 
agreements oblige their members to provide for innovation in fossil 
fuel energy technologies to enable continued production, higher 
rates of production, and market-competitively priced production. 
In short, these agreements call for energy innovations to 
provide sustained high levels of production of low-cost fossil fuels 
                                                                                                             
 41. While few might doubt the EU’s and its Member States commitments to 
renewable energy, others might doubt China or the U.S.; however, such 
concerns are largely unmerited. China is the world’s largest consumer of coal, 
but it also led investment in carbon-free energy in 2013 by funding $61,300 
million in research, develop, and installation. RICHARD J. CAMPBELL, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL41748, CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES – A COMPARISON 
OF GREEN ENERGY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES, 1 and 4, respectively (2014). For a 
discussion on the U.S.’s efforts to support carbon-free energy technologies, see 
infra Part III. Even OPEC has reaffirmed its commitments to supporting the 
Conventions goals, see infra Part II.B.3. 




at prices competitive to market alternatives. Should they remain in 
effect, it is reasonably foreseeable that petroleum and other fossil 
fuels would remain in production at a potentially increasing level 
of output and thus sustain the provision of large supplies of 
competitively priced fuels for the global market. 
A. The Energy Charter Treaty 
The ECT was originally drafted to facilitate trade in energy 
supplies and services.42 It includes within its definition of “energy 
materials and products” items related to nuclear energy, coal power, 
various petroleum resources and products, natural gas energy, 
electrical energy, and certain forms of charcoal.43 It supports a broad 
range of energy activities, including exploration, extraction, 
production, refining, storage, transport, distribution and marketing.44 
Given this coverage, the whole of upstream, midstream, and 
downstream fossil fuels are addressed by the ECT.45 
The ECT establishes state sovereignty and that the states have 
sovereign rights over the energy resources within their jurisdictions.46 
Thus, each state is empowered to decide what areas within its 
sovereign control are to be “made available for exploration and 
development.”47 They may also determine at what rates their 
resources may be depleted or extracted.48 Environmental and other 
                                                                                                             
 42. The Energy Charter Treaty [hereinafter ECT] Annex I to the Final Act of 
the European Energy Charter Conference, Dec. 17, 1994. See also ECT, at art. 2, 
“This Treaty establishes a legal framework in order to promote long-term 
cooperation in the energy field . . .” Its membership includes, broadly, European 
countries, Eurasian/Post-Soviet countries, Japan, and Australia. Its observers include 
Canada, China, the U.S., and others. See Members and Observers, ENERGY 
CHARTER, (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=61, archived at 
http://perma.cc/ABA8-EB74. 
 43. ECT, art. 1, sec. 4, which references the Harmonized System of the 
Customs Co-operation Council and the Combined Nomenclature of the European 
Communities. See the listings at ECT, Annex EM, for a complete listing of the 
various energy resources included within the ECT. The nuclear energy options 
under Annex EM do not include traditional fusion nuclear energy supplies but 
only fissile energy supplies and stocks. See Annex EM, sec. 26.12 and 28.44. 
 44. ECT, art. 1, sec. 5. 
 45. However, not to the exclusion of other energy sources, such as nuclear 
energy. 
 46. ECT, art. 18, sec. 1. This recognition is tempered in a subsidiary 
requirement, also at sec. 1, that such sovereign rights are subject to the rules of 
international law. 
 47. Id. at sec. 3. 
 48. Id. 




safety concerns remain similarly within the sovereign control of the 
states.49 
The ECT sought to “develop an open and competitive market, for 
Energy Materials and Products.”50 However, many of the signatory 
parties were not members of the World Trade Organization’s General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (WTO/GATT) systems regulating 
international trade; therefore, the ECT references the WTO/GATT 
agreements as guidelines for its own implementation.51 For instance, 
all parties to the ECT may not apply any trade related investment 
measures inconsistent with article III or XI of the GATT.52 Each 
Contracting Party is required to alleviate market distortions and 
barriers to trade.53 Further, transit and transportation of products and 
services covered by the ECT are to be governed by the principle of 
freedom of transit without distinction to origin, destination, or 
ownership.54 
The ECT facilitates innovation in fossil fuel energy industries, as 
well as in other energy sectors. The transfer of energy technology 
between Contracting Parties is to be facilitated.55 Investment in 
energy sectors of the Contracting Parties is to be encouraged,56 which 
may be facilitated by programs and measures of the Contracting 
Parties.57 
The ECT provides clarity on how Environmental Impact (EI) 
should be addressed by the Contracting Parties.58 EIs are defined to 
include any given effect on the environment without particular 
reference to beneficial or harmful impacts.59 EI might include such 
factors as human health and safety, air, water, and climate impacts; it 
may also include a wide range of impacts on socio-economic 
conditions.60 Each Contracting Party is obligated to minimize the 
range of potential EI in economically efficient manners.61 Such 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at art. 3. 
 51. Id. at art. 4 and 5. 
 52. ECT, art. 5(1). 
 53. Id. at art. 6. 
 54. Id. at art. 7. 
 55. Id. at art. 8. 
 56. Id. at art. 10, sec. 1. 
 57. Id. at art. 9. 
 58. ECT, art. 19. 
 59. Id. at sec. 3(b). 
 60. Id. From such a broad perspective on potential EI, the effects of 
anthropogenic climate change are reasonably includable as EI. 
 61. ECT, pt. 4, art. 19, sec. 1. Energy Cycle is defined to be the full set of 
activities associated with a given type of energy resource over the complete life-
span of the resource from extraction to final consumption and emissions. ECT, 
art. 19, at sec. 3(a). 




measures to minimize impacts should consider areas both within and 
without the specific state and consider the whole Energy Cycle of the 
relevant energy source.62 Each Contracting Party is to undertake 
precautionary measures to prevent or minimize environmental 
degradation.63 When uncertainty exists over the interpretation of the 
environmental provisions of the ECT, the primary resort should be to 
other appropriate international forums a prior to taking ECT-based 
environmental disputes to review by the Charter Conference.64 
Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this article, the 
Contracting Parties have obligations to promote innovation and 
adoption of:65 
i. Energy efficiency technologies; 
ii. Renewable energy resources; and 
iii. Promotion of the use of cleaner greenhouse gas emitting 
fuels. 
Such technologies and energy innovations must be shared;66 
furthermore, the Contracting Parties are required to promote and 
cooperate in the research, development, and application of those 
technologies.67 Finally, the Contracting parties are obligated to 
promote public awareness of these new energy technologies.68 
Thus, it is clear that the ECT promotes multiple forms of energy 
innovations, including fossil fuels and renewable energy sources. 
There are specific provisions for losses and expropriations.69 
Investments in energy sectors are not to be nationalized, expropriated, 
or subjected to measures having similar effects unless four tests are 
met.70 First, the only approved purpose for an expropriatory act is one 
whose purpose is in the public interest.71 Second, the act of 
                                                                                                             
 62. See Energy Charter Treaty, art. 19(1), opened for signature Dec. 17, 
1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force April 16, 1998). Such measures to 
include the full Energy Cycle should promote market-oriented prices but also 
provide for the inclusion of more complete environmental costs from that full 
Energy Cycle. See ECT, art. 19, at sec. 1(b). 
 63. See Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 62. 
 64. See id. at art.19(2). 
 65. See id. at art.19(1)(d). 
 66. See id. at art.19(1)(e). 
 67. ECT, art.19(1)(g). 
 68. See id. at art.19(1)(f). 
 69. See id. at arts. 12 and 13. 
 70. See id. at art. 13(1). 
 71. See id. at art.13(1)(a). Measures undertaken to limit anthropogenic climate 
change might reasonably be construed as in the public interest, so a reasonable 
reader might wonder if climate change policies that limited property rights or 
infringed on free trade principles might be accepted hereunder as in the “public 
interest.” While art. 11 is safe from the application of art. 24, it is of note that art. 
24, generally speaking, allows for any Contracting Party to preclude application of 




expropriation may not be discriminatory in character.72 Third, any act 
of expropriation must be conducted under due process of law.73 
Finally, any such act must be accompanied by the payment of prompt, 
adequate, and effective compensation; such compensation must be for 
the fair market value of the asset.74 
Thus, the ECT provides for the on-going research, development 
and investment into energy technologies across a spectrum of energy 
alternatives, but it primarily attempts to provide a legal framework to 
integrate the energy markets of the Contracting Parties. As such, the 
primary energy innovations would be in the fossil fuels and nuclear 
energy sectors. 
B. Conventions of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries 
 Five countries established OPEC in 1960: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and Venezuela.75 Presently, it has one dozen members, 
including Qatar, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, 
Ecuador, Gabon, and Angola.76 
1. The OPEC Statute 
OPEC is primarily governed by the OPEC Statute.77 The 
“principal aim of the Organization shall be the coordination and 
unification of the petroleum policies of the Member Countries.”78 
Further, the Statute requires OPEC to determine the best means to 
protect the Member Countries’ individual and collective interests.79 
                                                                                                             
 
any section of the ECT if a Contracting Party deems it “necessary to prtoect 
human, animal, or plant life or health.” Id. art. 24(b)(i). Thus, if climate change 
were found to cause such forms of harm, then it could well be deemed necessary 
to limit application of the ECT under 24-2(b)(i) or under 13-1(a). 
 72. ECT, art. 13(1)(b). If climate change measures were to be introduced in 
alignment with the ECT, then such measures would need to also be non-
discriminatory, even if otherwise allowable as a form of expropriation. Similarly, 
see id. at art. 24(2), for limits on disguised restriction or certain forms of trade 
discrimination. 
 73. Id. at art. 13(1)(c). 
 74. Id. at art. 13(1)(d). 
 75. Member Countries, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (Jan. 
10, 2015), http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/BM69-S73H. 
 76. Id. 
 77. OPEC Statute, art. 1, Jan. 1961, 443 U.N.T.S. 247. 
 78. Id. art. 2(A). 
 79. Id. 




Thus, OPEC has an active duty to provide for the coordinated 
planning of the interests of oil exporting countries. 
A Member State can be either one of the original five founder 
countries or any other country that possesses a “substantial net 
export of crude petroleum” and is otherwise well aligned with the 
pre-existing members of OPEC.80 If a country has net exports of 
petroleum, but not ‘substantial net exports,’ then it is entitled to join 
OPEC as an Associate Member but not as a Full Member.81 This 
means that the voting membership of OPEC is limited to countries 
that are substantial net exporters of petroleum.82 
One of the Organization’s primary goals is to ensure the 
economic viability of petroleum products and investments. OPEC is 
required to stabilize prices for petroleum products and to eliminate 
price fluctuations to promote petroleum’s role in international 
markets.83 Further, the Organization is tasked with securing steady 
income for its Member Countries, securing efficient, economic, and 
regular petroleum supplies for consuming nations, and securing fair 
returns on investments in the petroleum industry.84 The Organization 
is overseen by a Secretary General who must meet certain 
prerequisites for service, including a minimum of a decade in the “oil 
industry,” while ministry service or oversight of international business 
operations are seen as preferable.85 These requirements have not been 
amended since the original enactment of the Statute.86 
The Secretary General of OPEC is assisted in his duties by the 
Division of Research.87 The Division of Research is required to 
research, forecast, and monitor the petro-energy and petro-chemical 
industries for hydrocarbons and derived products, including non-
energy products.88 The Division of Research is also tasked with 
maintaining research on economic and financial factors associated 
                                                                                                             
 80. See id. at art. 7(A)–(C). 
 81. See id. at art. 7(D). 
 82. Indonesia was once a Full Member, but it has not only lost its Full 
Member status it has also lost Associate Member status as well due to its change 
from a net-exporter to a net-importer of petroleum. It terminated its membership 
in 2009. See Member Countries, supra note 75. 
 83. See OPEC Statute, supra note 77, at art. 2(B). 
 84. See id. at art. 2(C). 
 85. Id. at art. 28(A)(c). 
 86. See generally OPEC Statute, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING 
COUNTRIES (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/345 
.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/NHK9-QJ6B. See also OPEC Statue, supra note 
77, at Amendments to the Statue. 
 87. OPEC Statute, supra note 77, at art. 32(A). 
 88. See id. at art. 33(A)(2). 




with the above industries and products.89 The Division has a duty to 
advance data sharing across Member Countries.90 
Similarly, the Secretary General is assisted by the Division of 
Support Services.91 One of the Division’s duties is to keep the 
Secretary General abreast of policy changes in the international 
petroleum industry, which could affect OPEC or its Member 
Countries.92 Further, when OPEC’s own resources are insufficient to 
fulfill the above duties, the Secretary General is to commission 
consultants as necessary.93 
2. OPEC Solemn Declaration II of 2000 
OPEC may convene Summits to bring together the collected 
heads of state of the Member Countries to further refine and clarify 
the policies and agendas of the Organization.94 There have been 
three such Summits: in 1975, in 2000, and in 2007.95 The second 
Summit of 2000 was convened against the backdrop of global 
negotiations on climate change.96 The third Summit was drawn to 
support and re-affirm the centrality of natural resources and the 
sovereign rights of the Member Countries to govern their own 
resources.97 The Solemn Declarations are the work products of those 
Summits; they enhance but do not amend the OPEC Statute.98 
The Solemn Declaration II is a brief but dense four-page 
document containing 20 resolutions.99 The Declaration charges 
OPEC to continue to preserve and enhance the role of crude oil and 
natural gas in world energy markets. It calls for a cessation in 
efforts to discriminate against petroleum products and for the 
reduction of petroleum or carbon taxes that cause similar trade 
                                                                                                             
 89. See id. at art. 33(A)(3). 
 90. See id. at art. 33(A)(4). 
 91. See id. at art. 32(A). 
 92. Id. at art. 33(B)(3). 
 93. OPEC Statute, supra note 77, at art. 34(A). 
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effects. It also delimits OPEC’s support of the UNFCCC’s goals; it 
starkly confronts the global community to recognize poverty and 
not climate change as the premier environmental tragedy. As such, 
the Declaration supports the expansion of petroleum consumption 
as a means to end global poverty; OPEC is to remain on path to 
provide technological innovations to ensure the supply and 
affordability of petroleum products and industries. 
The Declaration reaffirms the role of OPEC to preserve and 
enhance the “role oil would play in meeting future energy 
demand.”100 OPEC has a duty to steward and optimize the economic 
value recoverable from the Member Countries petroleum assets.101 In 
particular, OPEC is to protect the OPEC Member Countries’ share of 
petroleum revenues vis-à-vis other oil exporting countries.102 
OPEC has a duty to ensure that petroleum products remain 
remunerative for its owners and investors, stable in supply, and 
competitive with other energy sources for consumers.103 Additionally, 
the Solemn Declaration II calls for increased consumption of crude oil 
and natural gas when “other fuels are recognized as being damaging 
to the global environment.”104 The Declaration calls on consuming 
countries to prevent discrimination against crude oil consumption, 
stating that they should “adopt fair and equitable treatment of oil in 
world energy markets.”105 Key among those forms of discrimination 
are differing forms of petroleum taxes and potential carbon taxes; the 
Declaration calls these taxes a burden that prevents just and equitable 
terms of trade.106 
The Solemn Declaration II delimits OPEC support of the 
UNFCCC. It does recognize and support OPEC’s engagement with 
the UNFCCC, but it requires special attention to two policies that 
would limit the overall impact on petroleum producers and certain 
potential petroleum consumers.107 First, the UNFCCC should be 
guided by recognition of the “principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility,” that not all countries should face identical 
consequences for industrialization and resultant carbon emissions as 
                                                                                                             
 100. Id. at RESOL. 1. 
 101. See id. at RESOL. 2. 
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 104. Id. at RESOL. 11. The Declaration does not explicitly state what kinds of 
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many countries have not yet benefitted from such industrialization 
and did not yet emit such volumes of greenhouse gases.108 
Additionally, the Declaration urges the countries listed in Annex I of 
the UNFCCC to promote measures to minimize the adverse social 
and economic impacts that would occur to countries whose 
economies are highly dependent on the production and export of 
fossil fuels.109 
Additionally, the Declaration warns that OPEC will retain the 
eradication of poverty, not climate change, as its premier target for 
economic and social development and sustainability.110 In fact, the 
Declaration explicitly challenges the Annex I nations to “recognize 
that the premier environmental tragedy facing the globe is human 
poverty,” and not anthropogenic climate change.111 It states that 
OPEC will continue to engage in the UNFCCC processes but that 
OPEC will also continue its advocacy on poverty issues within 
other UN forums.112 
3. OPEC Solemn Declaration III of 2007 
The Solemn Declaration III113 follows and extends the principles 
of the previous Declaration by developing three themes: stability of 
energy markets, energy for sustainable development, and energy and 
the environment.114 
Under the theme of stability for energy markets, the Declaration 
promotes increases in investment in both upstream and downstream 
capacities to enable greater supplies of petroleum to reach the 
market.115 The instability of petroleum supplies, petroleum demand, 
and short-term energy prices are to be improved for the benefit of 
                                                                                                             
 108. Id. 
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both producers and consumers.116 The roles of both technology and 
innovation in efficiency and sustainability of petroleum production 
are to be promoted.117 Finally, the Declaration calls for the adoption 
of transparent, non-discriminatory, and predictable trade, fiscal, 
environmental, and energy policies to better enable free trade access 
to markets. Clearly, this section expects petroleum production to be 
sustained and expanded upon by support from technology and 
innovation and rewarded with access to markets without limits 
posed by environmental or trade barriers. 
Within the topic of energy for sustainable development, the 
Declaration reasserts that the eradication of poverty should be the 
“first and overriding global priority.”118 Developed countries are 
urged to promote the diffusion of technology, especially 
environmentally friendly technologies, to developing countries.119 
The Declaration announces a plan to eradicate what it refers to as 
“energy poverty” in the developing world.120 As a part of that plan, 
OPEC is called to develop financial tools and measures to ensure that 
financial cooperation among OPEC members enables those 
developing countries to obtain the energy products they need.121 
Under its discussion on energy and environment, the Declaration 
calls for OPEC to provide “clean, affordable and competitive 
petroleum resources for global prosperity.”122 It calls for cost-
effective measures to address global environmental problems.123 It 
calls for the support of forests and reforestation as a means to sink 
greenhouse gases.124 
Yet, the discussion re-addresses the “common but differentiated” 
paradigm of the previous Declaration.125 Within the same set of 
resolutions, it calls for the OPEC countries to promote innovation in 
petroleum technology with the “objective of increasing the petroleum 
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resource base.”126 It also calls for technological innovations to reduce 
the costs of production.127 The Declaration calls for policies based on 
the UNFCCC to take into account the special needs of countries 
heavily dependent on the production and export of fossil fuels.128 
Finally, the declaration calls for two fields of technological 
innovation: (i) the transformation of petroleum products into clean 
energy products and (ii) the development of technologies that address 
climate change.129 
III. ENERGY SECURITY POLICY LAWS DRIVE INNOVATION IN 
ENERGY, ALL DIRECTIONS 
The United States supports innovations in energy resources 
through multiple measures and toolsets. While the United States is 
not the only nation to seek energy security, it is perhaps both the 
largest and most obvious example. The Department of Energy 
(DOE) is charged with leading civilian efforts and the Department 
of Defense (DOD) with the military efforts; however, both 
Departments are dwarfed in spending and are influenced by the 
effect of tax policies embedded within the United States’ federal 
income tax code. But the United States’ overall policy is to pursue 
all directions at once: green energy, conventional hydrocarbons, and 
innovative nuclear technology are all encouraged by the DOE, the 
DOD, and by the Internal Revenue Code. The following subsections 
provide a review of all three approaches to demonstrate that the 
promotion of energy security provides for innovations and future 
production of both fossil fuel resources and renewable energy 
resources. 
A. Federal Research Programs 
The United States maintains extensive support for the research 
and development of energy innovations. This support can be 
compared in terms of scale to the research programs that supported 
the development of the atomic bomb and the Apollo moon 
landings.130 Whereas the Manhattan Project spent $22 billion over 
five years and the greater NASA/Apollo program spent $98 billion 
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over 14 years, the broader federal energy innovation projects spent 
more than $118 billion over 35 years prior to 2009; the annual 
rates of expenditure for energy innovation fell between the annual 
expenditures for the previous two programs.131 
However, the United States has supported energy innovation for 
longer than suggested by the above narrative. Arguably, the Hoover 
Dam Project and the Manhattan Project were energy research 
projects in that they provided new forms or scales of energy 
production.132 Nonetheless, earnest energy innovation support began 
under the shadow of the 1970s oil supply shocks.133 This support 
occurred in two steps. First, the United States government increased 
coordination on energy innovation oversight by coalescing multiple 
energy research groups into the Energy Research and Development 
Administration (ERDA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC).134 A second focusing of energy innovation efforts resulted 
in the creation of the DOE by merging the ERDA with 50 other 
energy offices and programs across the federal government.135In the 
first five years of those focused efforts to drive energy innovations, 
the federal government spent over $40 billion.136 
The DOE has faced declining budgetary support from Congress in 
recent years; it received $10 billion in 1980 but only $3.4 billion in 
2012.137 Most of the DOE’s research funding is driven to direct 
investment in research and development of energy innovations; its 
capacity for loans and loan guarantees has been effectively defunded 
by Congress.138 The DOE supports research programs in fossil fuels, 
nuclear energy, energy efficiency, and renewable energy sources.139 
Approximately 27% of the DOE’s research budget is allocated to 
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 132. The Hoover Dam began as a federally funded development with the 
Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1928). The Manhattan Project was 
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renewable energy sources and another 27% is allocated to energy 
efficiency research.140 Twenty-three percent of its funds are allocated 
to nuclear research.141 Ten percent is aimed at fossil fuel research 
programs; primarily, programs that reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.142 The remainder is mostly spent on electrical delivery and 
reliability research.143 
B. United States Department of Defense and Energy Innovations 
While the DOE is the lead executive branch department tasked 
with stewarding energy innovations, the DOD actually spends more 
on energy products than any other section of the federal 
government, thus its policies and measures to impact energy 
innovation are noteworthy.144 Reportedly, the DOD might be the 
world’s largest energy consumer.145 In 2010, the DOD’s energy 
consumption represented 80% of the energy consumed by the 
federal government; it consumed an estimated 880 trillion BTUs 
that year.146 It is also important to note that the legal aspects of these 
measures are primarily driven by budget requests and their 
integration in the budgetary measures approved by Congress. 
The Defense Production Act provides authority for the DOD and 
its military branches to engage in support of energy technologies and 
resources.147 First and foremost, energy is central to the Act’s concept 
of “national defense:” “[t]he term ‘national defense’ means programs 
for military and energy production or construction, military or critical 
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App. § 2061 (2012). 




infrastructure assistance to any foreign nation, homeland security, 
stockpiling, space, and any directly related activity.”148 
The Act establishes that the “security of the United States is 
dependent on the ability of the domestic industrial base to supply 
materials and services for the national defense and to prepare for and 
respond to military conflicts, natural or man-caused disasters, or acts 
of terrorism within the United States,” and that “in order to ensure 
national defense preparedness, it is necessary and appropriate to 
assure the availability of domestic energy supplies for national 
defense needs[.]”149 The Act requires that “to the maximum extent 
possible, domestic energy supplies should be augmented through 
reliance on renewable energy sources (including solar, geothermal, 
wind, and biomass sources), more efficient energy storage and 
distribution technologies, and energy conservation measures . . . .”150 
The DOD and the President of the United States are granted 
broad powers to economically support and encourage industrial 
activities under the Act; purchase orders, federal loans, and federally 
backed loan guarantees are all made available. First, the DOD can 
move to provide industrial support via directed purchases, enabling 
private producers to obtain independent financing given secured 
sales or delivery contracts:151 
To create, maintain, protect, expand, or restore domestic 
industrial base capabilities essential for the national 
defense, the President may make provision— 
(A) for purchases of or commitments to purchase an industrial 
resource or a critical technology item, for Government use or 
resale; 
(B) for the encouragement of exploration, development, and 
mining of critical and strategic materials, and other materials; 
(C) for the development of production capabilities; and 
(D) for the increased use of emerging technologies in 
security program applications and the rapid transition of 
emerging technologies— 
(i) from Government-sponsored research and development 
to commercial applications; and 
(ii) from commercial research and development to 
national defense applications.152 
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Second, energy resource providers can receive direct federal loans 
when necessary: 
[T]he President may make provision for loans to private 
business enterprises (including nonprofit research 
corporations and providers of critical infrastructure) for the 
creation, maintenance, expansion, protection, or restoration of 
capacity, the development of technological processes, or the 
production of essential materials, including the exploration, 
development, and mining of strategic and critical metals and 
minerals.153 
Third, if the commercial producers need financial support to achieve 
production targets 
the President may authorize a guaranteeing agency to provide 
guarantees of loans by private institutions for the purpose of 
financing any contractor, subcontractor, provider of critical 
infrastructure, or other person in support of production 
capabilities or supplies that are deemed by the guaranteeing 
agency to be necessary to create, maintain, expedite, expand, 
protect, or restore production and deliveries or services 
essential to the national defense.154 
When the United States provides support “to correct a domestic 
industrial base shortfall, the President should give consideration to 
the creation or maintenance of production sources that will remain 
economically viable after such assistance has ended . . . .”155 Thus, 
to the extent that DOD measures under the Act call for additional 
energy innovations, priority must be given to those technologies that 
would be economically feasible after establishment under the Act. 
There are limits to the powers to provide economic incentives and 
supports for energy innovation under the Defense Production Act, 
but most of them are waived during periods of declared national 
emergency. Because the United States is currently in multiple states 
of declared emergency, those limits may not apply.156 Thus the 
DOD, via the Defense Production Act, has extensive capacities to 
encourage and foster energy innovations outside of the civilian 
efforts at the DOE. 
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The primary fuels consumed by the DOD are products derived 
from petroleum.157 The vast majority of that fuel is used to power 
aircraft.158 This reliance on liquid fossil fuels is complicated by the 
fact that the DOD maintains fleets of aircraft and vessels that are 
expected to remain in service for long-term periods, so while the 
source of that liquid energy might be novel, e.g., green bio-diesel, 
the need to combust that fuel in the in-place mechanical assets such 
as boat engines or jet engines will remain the same.159 Thus, the 
DOD financially supports innovations in alternative liquid fuel 
sources. The United States Air Force (USAF) undertook obligations 
to acquire 50% of its domestic aviation fuels from alternative fuel 
blends by 2016.160 Also notable in the USAF’s approach is their 
apparent intent to drive the innovation by market demand, i.e., their 
procurement processes will be mandated to obtain such fuels instead 
of providing pre-market subsidies. This is best reflected in two 
elements: first, the USAF’s primary expenditures on alternative 
fuels are to upgrade its engine assets to match new fuel blends,161 
and second, the USAF has pre-established a certification program to 
approve alternative fuels from bio-fuels, alcohol-derived aviation 
fuels, and Fischer-Tropsch-transformed natural gas stocks of 
aviation fuel.162 
The United States Navy (USN) and the United States Marine 
Corps (USMC) have announced their goals to “lead the Nation in 
sustainable energy.”163 “[The Department of the Navy] will be 
protecting the environment with clean energy and lessening our 
dependence on foreign oil,” by increasing reliance on alternative 
fuels, bio-fuels, solar energy systems and geothermal energy 
systems.164 By 2016, they intend to develop and deploy a “Green 
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Strike Group,” a cluster of ocean vessels and aircraft powered 
exclusively by biofuels, as a demonstration of the potential of 
biofuels.165 They plan to ensure that 50% of USN and USMC fuel 
needs could be met with biofuels by 2020 by financially supporting 
innovations in biofuels, alongside the Departments of Agriculture 
and DOE, with over $500 million in committed funds.166 
The net result of the DOD’s powers to support innovation in 
energy sources, combined with its focus on replacing petroleum-
derived aviation fuels, is that both additional capacity in alternative 
liquid fuels will be created at the same time that large quantities of 
petroleum-based fuels will no longer be consumed, thus the market 
will likely have increased quantities of both petroleum-derived and 
non-petroleum-based liquid fuels available for purchase. 
C. Federal Income Tax Incentives 
The oil and gas sector has long received certain tax treatments 
from the United States Tax Code that are either obvious incentives 
for additional volumes of production, obvious incentives for 
technological enhancements that maintain the competitive cost 
structure of oil and gas investments, or are suspected incentives for 
increased levels of production, such as the depletion allowance. 
More recently, in 2006, the tax code added tax credits and other 
incentives for new and renewable energy sources.167 
Combined, these tax incentives strongly facilitate energy 
innovations and aid in their commercial feasibility. The combined 
annual value of the tax code-driven incentives have been estimated at 
$20 billion, dwarfing the DOE’s $3.5 billion in annual supports for 
the same targets.168 As such, the tax code incentives represent the 
lion’s share of the federal government’s efforts to encourage energy 
innovation. 
While support for energy has long been an area of focus within 
the tax code, it does not suggest that tax policy makers have slowed 
down their legislative efforts to provide for energy innovation 
supports. In the last decade, there have been 11 major enactments 
that addressed energy policy via tax code incentives.169 Thus, the tax 
code remains a hot area of energy policy efforts. 
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1. Tax Incentives for Hydrocarbon Energy Production 
Reportedly, tax credits and deductions have provided $470 billion 
in benefits to petroleum producers since the United States’ federal 
income system began. 170 That estimate includes the forecasted $4.8 
billion in annual benefits in recent years. 171 The scale of these 
benefits has led to calls for their repeal, including President Obama’s 
recent budget proposal for fiscal year 2014.172 Repeal of these tax 
incentives has been estimated to potentially provide $3.1 billion to 
$4.3 billion a year in additional tax revenues.173 
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides a range of tax credits 
uniquely applicable to oil and gas producers.174 IRC § 43 provides 
tax credits for costs associated with enhanced oil recovery (EOR) 
methods; EOR methods are used to produce oil from fields where 
primary production has peaked and begun to decline. Primary 
production for oil wells is gravity driven and requires little beyond 
the well and pumps to extract crude oil from the well. EOR 
techniques enable enhanced recovery and rely on chemical 
injectants, gaseous pressure-injections, steam, and other means of 
heat injections into the well bed to stimulate additional production 
levels. Previously, this credit package sustained production when oil 
prices were low, but under current pricing levels, the credit is not 
available. A similar story can be told for IRC § 45(I), wherein wells 
with substantially low volumes of production were encouraged to 
remain in production; current pricing prevents the credit from being 
applicable.175 The credits would otherwise be $3 per barrel of crude 
oil or per 1000 standard cubic feet (scf) of natural gas.176 
IRC § 45(K) allows for a nonconventional source production 
credit for qualified fuels; the credit is set at $3 per barrel-of-oil 
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equivalent.177 Qualified fuels include oil produced from shale and 
tar sands, gas produced from geo-pressured brine, Devonian shale, 
coal seams, a tight formation, or from biomass, and liquid, gaseous, 
or solid synthetic fuels produced from coal (including lignite).178 
IRC § 45Q(a)(2) provides tax credits for carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) facilities that are affiliated with oil and gas production 
activities.179 The carbon dioxide sequestration credit is $10 per metric 
ton of qualified carbon dioxide, which is captured by the taxpayer at a 
qualified facility and disposed of by the taxpayer in secure geological 
storage.180 The oil and gas production activities need to qualify under 
the same qualifications as the EOR tax credits.181 
IRC § 907 provides tax credits for taxes paid on combined foreign 
oil and gas income derived outside of the United States.182 Such 
income is recognized as the sum of both incomes related to oil and 
gas extraction and to other processing, marketing, and distribution 
incomes derived from oil and gas activities.183 It is estimated that this 
allowance returns over $1 billion a year to petroleum producers.184 
There are also a variety of unique income tax deductions allowed 
for fossil fuel producers. IRC § 167(h) enables the geological and 
geophysical costs of oil and gas exploration and development to be 
depreciated on a quicker time schedule than the ordinary rules.185 It is 
estimated that this allowance returns $612 million to $1.1 billion a 
year to petroleum producers.186 
                                                                                                             
 177. Id. at § 45K(a)(1), (2). See also I.R.C. § 45K(d)(5) noting: “The term 
‘barrel-of-oil equivalent’ with respect to any fuel means that amount of such fuel 
which has a Btu content of 5.8 million . . . .” 
 178. Id. at § 45K(c)(1). 
 179. Id. at § 45Q(a)(2). 
 180. Id. at § 45Q(a)(2)(A), (B). 
 181. I.R.C. § 45Q(d)(4). “The term ‘qualified enhanced oil or natural gas 
recovery project’ has the meaning given the term ‘qualified enhanced oil recovery 
project’ by § 43 (c)(2), by substituting ‘crude oil or natural gas’ for ‘crude oil’ in 
subparagraph (A)(i) thereof.” 
 182. Id. at § 907(a), (b). 
 183. Id. at § 907(b)(1)(A). “[F]oreign oil gas extraction incomes” and (B) 
“[F]oreign oil related incomes.” 
 184. Pirog reported that the elimination of these credits could increase annual tax 
revenues by up to $11 billion over the tax decade of FY2014 to FY2023. PIROG, 
supra note 172, at 9. See also Daniel J. Weiss & Miranda Peterson, With Only $93 
Billion in Profits, the Big Five Oil Companies Demand to Keep Tax Breaks, 
ENERGY & ENVIRO., CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www 
.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2014/02/10/83879/with-only-93-billion-in-
profits-the-big-five-oil-companies-demand-to-keep-tax-breaks/, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/3UNB-Q483. 
 185. I.R.C. § 167(h)(1) allows for a 24-month recovery of the costs and I.R.C. § 
167(h)(5) allows certain major integrated oil companies seven years to recover the 
costs. 
 186. Kroll et al., supra note 170. 




IRC § 263(c) provides for the expensing of the intangible 
drilling and development costs associated with the development 
stage of an oil and gas project; this deduction allowance accelerates 
cost recovery on the investment.187 It is estimated that this 
allowance returns $700 million to $3.5 billion a year to petroleum 
producers.188 
IRC § 193 Tertiary Injectants enables the same-year cost recovery 
of the chemicals used to increase and facilitate production.189 The 
injectants must be injectants that are not recoverable hydrocarbons.190 
The costs of this program are relatively small, estimated at $50 
million over the five-year period beginning in 2013.191 
IRC § 199 allows a specific deduction of up to nine percent of the 
costs or incomes resulting from domestic production activities.192 
While the deduction is available to many industries beyond oil and 
gas, there are specific provisions for oil and gas producers that reduce 
the deduction by three percent.193 The production, refining, 
processing, transportation, or distribution of oil, gas, or any primary 
product is included as domestic production.194 It is estimated that this 
allowance returns $574 million to $1.4 billion a year to petroleum 
producers.195 
2. Tax Incentives for Alternative Energy Production 
While the IRC provides a larger economic boost to the fossil fuel 
industry, it also provides incentives for renewable energy programs; 
the expected costs of support for renewable energy innovations is 
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estimated at $39.5 billion for the five year period beginning in 
2013.196 The dominant focus within renewable energy incentives is 
on the development of technologies to produce electricity from 
renewable resources and the development of renewable transportation 
fuels.197 
IRC § 40 and IRC § 40A provide tax credits for producers of 
alternative liquid fuels such as alcohol-based fuels,198 bio-diesels, and 
renewable diesel fuels.199 Bio-diesel,200 agri-diesel,201 and renewable 
diesel producers can receive $1 per gallon of produced fuels.202 The 
cost of this program of tax credits is estimated to be $2.2 billion a 
year, with the alcohol component being comparatively small at $200 
million annually.203 
IRC § 45 enables a renewable electricity production credit to be 
earned by such producers; it returns $0.015 per kilowatt-hour 
produced.204 The qualified resources are enumerated: wind, closed-
loop biomass, open-loop biomass, geothermal energy, solar energy, 
small irrigation power, municipal solid waste, qualified hydropower 
production, and marine and hydrokinetic renewable energy.205 It is 
estimated that this allowance could return $1.7 billion a year to 
producers of electricity from renewable resources.206 
IRC § 45J enables an advanced nuclear power facility production 
credit; it returns $0.015 per kilowatt-hour produced by such 
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facilities.207 The dates of the design and intent to construct are key 
determinants of qualifying as an advanced nuclear power facility.208 
IRC § 45Q(a)(1) provides tax credits for CCS facilities that are 
not affiliated with oil and gas production activities.209 The carbon 
dioxide sequestration credit is $20 per metric ton of qualified carbon 
dioxide, which is captured by the taxpayer at a qualified facility and 
disposed of by the taxpayer in secure geological storage.210 
IRC § 48 Energy Credits, or investment tax credits (ITC), are 
available to investments in energy production that utilize geothermal 
sources, micro-turbine sources, or combined heat and power 
solutions. The ITC may be up to ten percent of the investment in the 
energy project.211 The value of the credit program to investors has 
been estimated at $500 million annually.212 
IRC § 25D provides a 30% tax credit for the purchases and 
installations of a variety home-based solar and wind power 
systems.213 The value of those credits has been estimated to be close 
to $900 million a year.214 
The impacts of tax code incentives for renewable energy might 
best be perceived from an “effective tax rate” (ETR) perspective 
instead of a bulk dollar perspective. An ETR is the tax rate as 
experienced after the various incentives have been included within 
the final tax calculation. Renewable energy projects show 
stunningly low ETR. Producers of electricity from solar thermal 
projects benefit from an ETR of -244.7 and wind projects benefit 
from their ETR of -163.8;215 the minus sign denotes an effective net 
tax payment to the producers from the government. Nuclear power 
producers also benefit from an ETR of -99.5,216 effectively reducing 
their tax incidence to incidental levels. Oil and gas producers range 
in ETR; integrated companies face an ETR of 15.2 while non-
integrated operations benefit from an ETR of -13.5.217 Producers of 
electricity from natural gas pay the highest ETR of 34.4.218 Thus, it 
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could be argued that renewable energy projects face more favorable 
net ETR under the tax code. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS DRIVE COMPETITION IN THE 
MARKETPLACE 
The global trading system, as exemplified by the WTO, works to 
secure the free trade of goods and services without discriminatory 
tariffs or barriers. The WTO is not the only such effort, as there are 
many regional trade zones that either provide broad economic 
alignments, such as the EU, or provide zones of expedited free trade, 
such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) zone. These 
organizations strive to provide protection to equal terms of trade and 
open markets with limited exceptions to protect certain national 
interests. 
To the extent that energy resources, their products, and the 
services that sustain their use are covered by the WTO and its 
agreements, and similarly by other free trade groups, those energy 
products and services are likely to benefit from the application of the 
free trade regimes established by such organizations. As such, the 
various existing energy products, both fossil fuel and renewables, 
would benefit from free trade and removal of restraints and 
discriminations to their flow in the global marketplace. Without 
other environmental trade agreements to the contrary, this would 
enable various energy products and services to compete with each 
other directly on energy content and price structures, fostering 
additional competition in the energy sector. 
A. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
The GATT219 provides a legal framework for the WTO’s efforts 
to reduce barriers to trade and the elimination of discriminatory 
treatment in international commerce.220 
1. The GATT Attempts to Achieve the Free Flow and Free 
Trade of Goods. 
The GATT begins by requiring each contracting party to provide 
“most favored nation” treatment to all other contracting parties;221 this 
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treatment enables each contracting party to set its own unique custom 
or tariff measures while simultaneously enabling all other parties to 
receive as-good-as terms. Each contracting party is also required to 
maintain “schedules of concessions” of their measures.222 Domestic 
taxes and similar levies are likewise required to offer no benefit to 
domestic production nor discrimination against foreign production.223 
Freedom of transit, of several varieties, is guaranteed under the 
GATT.224 
No quantitative prohibitions or restrictions may be imposed on the 
importation of goods between contracting parties, other than by 
duties, taxes, and the like.225 If a quantitative prohibition or restriction 
is imposed, then the GATT requires those measures to be equally 
applied against all third parties.226 The GATT prohibits domestic 
regulations of contracting parties from requiring domestic production 
content, and prohibits domestic regulations from setting guidelines for 
foreign production content.227 
Temporary shocks to the free trade system can be accommodated 
under the GATT. Subsidies to increase exports or reduce imports can 
be permitted under the GATT, but not without a substantial review of 
the circumstances.228 Dumping of products below comparable prices 
is prohibited and may be responded to by assessment of levies to 
“correct” for the market price of the dumped goods.229 Similarly, 
when unforeseen developments place domestic products at risk of 
serious injury, then contracting parties may take certain liberties with 
their GATT obligations with regard to their schedule of 
concessions.230 
2. The GATT Particularly Promotes Exports of Fossil Fuels 
from Developing Parties. 
The GATT recognizes that the attainment of its trade policy goals 
would be best achieved coincident with the progressive development 
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of those contracting parties whose economies can only support low 
standards of living and are in early stages of development.231 Such 
developing contracting parties may apply flexibility to their tariff 
structures to support a nascent industry, or they may apply 
quantitative measures to similarly support development.232 
Contracting parties that qualify as both “low standards of living” 
and “in early stages of development” shall be free to temporarily 
deviate from the GATT’s terms under specific requirements.233 For 
those countries that depend heavily on exports of a small number of 
primary commodities234 such as oil, when those exports are seriously 
reduced, then those contracting parties may seek Consultation for 
sympathetic consideration for flexibility under the GATT 
requirements.235 
In order to help less-developed contracting parties develop their 
economies and improve their standards of living, the GATT supports 
the rapid and sustained expansion of those parties’ export earnings.236 
Since most of those parties rely heavily on the export of primary 
products such as crude oil or natural gas,237 the GATT supports 
recognition of the need to provide favorable and acceptable access to 
world markets “in the largest possible measure.”238 Stable, equitable, 
and remunerative prices are to be achieved by the WTO’s policies and 
the efforts of contracting parties to support these primary products 
through expanding their demand on the world market and increasing 
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SC55 (crude oil is listed at Division 33, natural gas at Division 34, and coal at  
Division 32). 
 238. GATT, pt. IV, art. XXXVI, sec. 4. 




the level of trade in these primary resources.239 Thus, the GATT 
recognizes an obligation to support the sustained and competitive 
export of primary products, including fossil fuels, for the social and 
welfare needs of its lesser-developed contracting parties. 
However, this support of primary product exports is to be 
accompanied with ancillary developments in industrial 
diversification;240 this might be in converting primary products to 
secondary products or the development of industry unrelated to the 
primary products. Thus, Section 5 could be satisfied in a variety of 
ways related to energy products; for instance, (i) crude oil sales 
could be diversified to include refinery products; (ii) fossil fuel 
revenues could be used to acquire renewable energy technology 
and sources; or (iii) separate sources of financing could support 
acquisition of alternative energy sources. In all manners, the path 
of diversification could foreseeably result in additional energy 
products, potentially requiring increased levels of domestic 
primary production to support the diversified export product lines. 
To further support the lesser-developed contracting parties, the 
developed parties under the GATT agree to certain “commitments,” 
or obligations.241 Key among these obligations is to refrain from the 
introduction of non-tariff import barriers that might frustrate the 
export of primary products targeted in the above discussions.242 
Another obligation is to improve the access to world markets for 
those primary products of lesser-developed parties.243 Developed 
parties are obligated to undertake action to achieve international 
arrangements to facilitate such results if necessary; parties are 
encouraged to collaborate to achieve concrete measures to support 
long-run profitable export of those primary products.244 
While the original intent of these terms may not have foreseen 
the needs of climate change mitigation efforts, it appears that the 
developed countries do bear commitments to protect those critical 
primary product exports or, under Article XXXVI, to financially 
support the replacement of those revenues through some means of 
industrial diversification. 
While certain WTO parties are both developed and rich in fossil 
fuel resources,245 many countries rich in such assets remain lesser-
developed contracting parties to the GATT. To the extent that those 
countries need the revenues from the exports of their natural 
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resources, the developed parties of the WTO have undertaken 
obligations to not only allow, but to foster and encourage the 
development of such fossil fuel exports into the global markets. Given 
the number of lesser-developed states requiring such fossil fuel export 
revenues and the broader challenges of advancing their economies 
and standards of living, it is foreseeable that the WTO will need to 
continue the sustained support of expanding and ensuring the 
profitability of fossil fuel exports. Given those requirements, it is also 
reasonably foreseeable that the WTO would continue to ensure that 
larger supplies of fossil fuels remain on the market and that such 
products would be priced to remain sustainably competitive. 
3. Exceptions for Other Situations 
Article XX allows for the imposition of certain critical or 
necessary measures, so long as the measures themselves are not 
arbitrary or unjustifiable forms of trade restrictions or trade 
discrimination.246 There are several measures that might apply to the 
export of primary products and to the energy industries. 
First, if the imposed measure is necessary for the protection of 
human, animal, or plant life, then such a measure would not be 
prevented by the GATT.247 Given the multitude of concerns about the 
potential impacts of climate change, it would be reasonable for some 
parties to present arguments that they need to implement certain 
measures to mitigate the overall hazards to human life, animal life, 
and plant life within their jurisdictions. However, while such 
measures might be applied internally, it appears that no power exists 
under the GATT to impose such measures on other contracting 
parties; thus, if one party was concerned about the impact of fossil 
fuel consumption, it might be able to reduce fossil fuel consumption 
within its own jurisdiction but have no ability to impose a similar 
measure on a third contracting party. So, if that third party wanted to 
produce and export fossil fuel primary products or derivative 
products, then the GATT would not avail a power to limit that party’s 
choice of production; indeed, as discussed,248 the GATT might 
require the first party to support that export of fossil fuel if the first 
party was developed and the exporting party was a lesser-developed 
party. 
Second, if the measures are necessary to accommodate 
compliance with other treaties or regulations then the measures would 
                                                                                                             
 246. GATT, pt. II, art. XX. 
 247. Id. at sec. (b). 
 248. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussion on GATT’s role to support development 
of lesser-developed primary product exporting parties). 




not be prevented by the GATT, so long as those requirements and 
measures are not otherwise inconsistent with the requirements of the 
GATT.249 Similar to the key logic in the above paragraph, this section 
would allow parties to enable their own compliance with climate 
change agreements or energy market agreements, but it would not 
enable them to expand those measures onto other unwilling parties 
under the GATT. This section might allow multiple parties to engage 
in the development and construction of coordinated climate change 
measures and enable their own reduction of carbon emissions, but 
again, such measures would first need to be not inconsistent with the 
goals of the GATT, and second be limited to those volitionally so 
motivated and not beyond. Given that the GATT requires support of 
primary product exports from developing parties, climate change 
management efforts would need to accommodate those needs as well. 
Indeed, the UNFCCC does call for such assistance and the 
Technology Mechanism is an instance of such assistance,250 but the 
broader requirement to improve the economic development and to 
improve the standard of living for those lesser-developed parties 
remains; it is unclear if the UNFCCC measures will result in such 
changes.251 
The third and fourth measures are closely related. Third, if the 
measures are related to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources, then such measures would be allowed so long as they are 
implemented alongside similar restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption.252 Fourth, if a measure is undertaken to comply with 
any intergovernmental commodity agreement and is not otherwise 
inconsistent with the requirements of the GATT, then such a measure 
would be allowed.253 This is interesting in that a variety of such 
agreements, such as the ECT and OEPC, do exist for fossil fuel type 
commodities. OPEC and the ECT clearly call for larger supplies of 
fossil fuels at sustainable and competitive prices, goals that appear 
very much in line with the broader goals of the GATT. Also, while 
commodity exporters might be prevented from dumping oil products 
on other contacting parties,254 the GATT does not appear to prevent 
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them from self-constraining their own domestic production.255 
Broadly speaking, it is foreseeable that intergovernmental agreements 
on commodities, particularly commodities drawn from primary 
products, would be designed to increase the level of trade and export 
parties’ revenues; thus, it is foreseeable that Article XX(h) may lead 
to higher levels of fossil fuel production, not less. 
Ergo, while the GATT itself enables parties to undertake certain 
measures as general exceptions to the broader requirement of the 
GATT’s obligations, it appears that on balance such exceptions would 
do little to reduce fossil fuel production, sans volitional agreements 
by the relevant parties, and foreseeably its Article XX rules could lead 
to increased levels of such production. 
B. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
Energy is not only physical products, energy as an industry also 
includes a range of service products. This section examines the 
character of the General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS) 
for its influence on international and trans-boundary trade of energy 
products and services. 
The GATS’s rules apply to services rendered by a party in one 
Member to a customer in another Member.256 It supports the efforts 
of Members to create and enter into agreements of economic 
integration; such economic integration agreements both provide 
substantial sectorial coverage and provide for the absence or 
elimination of trade discrimination.257 
Domestic regulation of service industries must be reasonable, 
objective, and impartial.258 Technical standards or regulations must 
be based on objective and transparent criteria,259 not be more 
burdensome than necessary,260 and for licensing procedures, not be 
themselves a restriction on trade.261 Also, the GATS provides for the 
recognition that certain business practices of service suppliers may 
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also restrain competition which results in restrictions in trade of 
services.262 
The Members are obligated to support the growth and 
development of the domestic service capacity of developing 
Members.263 Key among these obligations are the requirements to 
liberalize market access and to liberalize the modes of supply of 
export interest to the developing Members.264 Due to the special 
economic situations, special priority is to be given to the support of 
least-developed Members.265 Their development, trade, and financial 
needs are to be taken account of in the setting of their obligations 
within the GATS.266 When developing Members are parties to 
agreements on economic integration, flexibility shall be allowed to 
them to support their development.267 
Article XIV “Security Exceptions” provides for Members to 
potentially take certain actions to support their obligations under the 
United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace 
and security;268 further, Members may take measures to provision a 
military establishment or to act in time of war or for emergencies in 
international relations.269 Arguendo, the impacts of climate change 
are expected to affect international peace and security, and most 
Members of the GATS are signatories to the UNFCCC and its 
subsequent accords, thus Members of the GATS might reasonably 
be allowed to deviate from the GATS’s rules to ameliorate 
anthropogenic climate change. Additionally, militaries are becoming 
increasingly responsive to imminent climate change impacts as part 
of their near-term planning,270 and as such, such measures might be 
well permitted under the GATS. 
Nothing within the GATS prevents Members from adopting 
domestic measures to address the causes of anthropogenic climate 
change, but it would limit the manner in which said measures were 
designed; the measures must remain in support of the goals of the 
GATS to enable free trade in services free from trade 
discrimination. 
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V. GREEN PARADOX RESULTS FROM CORNUCOPIA OF ENERGY 
INNOVATIONS 
A. Putting the Parts Together 
There are several conclusions to be drawn from the above 
discussions. First, legal measures intended to alleviate causes of 
anthropogenic climate change are providing incentives to stimulate 
innovation and production of energy from new and renewable energy 
sources. It is reasonable to expect at least some progress on this front, 
and if so, then energy supplies will increase. Anecdotal evidence 
supports the hope that green energy might soon be abundant and 
affordable.271 
Second, international legal conventions exist that support the 
sustained production and marketing of fossil fuels. As a part of their 
efforts, they also provide incentives for innovations to sustain, extend, 
and expand the current levels of hydrocarbon production. As seen in 
the recent shale (“frack”) oil developments, and in potential offshore 
methane hydrates developments, it is reasonably foreseeable that 
these efforts will result in additional and sustained hydrocarbon 
energy supplies; again, anecdotal evidence reinforces this 
conclusion.272 
Third, nations are pursuing energy security targets, as modern 
industrial nations are dependent on energy sources to sustain the 
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scale of their economies. For example, the United States is pursuing 
innovation on all fronts: renewables, hydrocarbons, and nuclear 
energy. Very large subsidies and other incentives are provided to 
attain these goals; again, it is reasonably foreseeable that energy 
security needs will result in greater energy supplies. Anecdotal 
reports support that progress is being made to further develop 
energy supplies for security.273 
Fourth, most of the world’s economies are connected via 
international trade law conventions that support free trade, trade 
without unfair tariffs, and discrimination-free trade. Thus, it would 
be very difficult to control the flow of energy products for 
contracting parties of those conventions. Further, the WTO has 
certain obligations to support the export of primary products and to 
ensure the growth of economic development and raise the standard 
of living for its contracting parties, especially its lesser-developed 
members. As such, these legal conventions will advance the 
competitive markets of energy products and provide the economic 
mechanisms that enable market forces to regulate market results. 
Clearly, the foreseeable result is the possibility that energy 
supplies will be expanded on a variety of fronts and that these 
energy products will face a fairly competitive marketplace. Given 
the nature of the market and the demand for energy from a growing 
and developing population, it is likely that more energy will be 
consumed; ergo, there is a risk that higher levels of fossil fuels will 
also be consumed. 
1. International Energy Laws are Driving a Cornucopia of 
Energy Innovations 
The above studies have shown that three major clusters of energy 
law or energy conventions provide incentives for energy innovations. 
Those energy innovations include all areas of energy sources: fossil 
fuels, renewable fuels, and others such as nuclear fuel. Those 
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measures are all aimed at increasing the potential amount of energy 
supply from targeted energy sources and ensuring that the resultant 
energy supplies are market competitive with other existing or 
emerging energy supplies. 
The UNFCCC provided a framework of strategies to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by multiple approaches.274 Energy 
efficiency was called for; however, energy efficiency leaves surplus 
energy on the market if not consumed, and the Jevons Paradox has 
long raised doubts of whether energy efficiency ever reduced 
consumption.275 Innovations in new and renewable energy sources 
were called for. With success, the world might soon have abundant 
supplies of green energy. But those energy products will be fungible 
and competitive with existing electrical supplies and transportation 
fuels; global competitive energy supplies will be increased. The 
prevention of methane emissions and the capture of carbon in sinks 
and reservoirs is laudable, but the presence of carbon sinks might 
serve to justify arguments that fossil fuels can be consumed safely. 
Many sinks and reservoirs, such as forests and wetlands, would not 
be directly connected to the energy user and would remain 
somewhat of a public good. Thus, many might claim to use what 
might only sustain a few in carbon absorption and storage. 
The role of the ECT and of OPEC to promote hydrocarbon 
resources is clearly laid out.276 Both organizations have contracting 
parties committed to the sustained development, production, and 
marketing of their petroleum and natural gas assets. They endeavor 
to ensure that their products remain price competitive with 
substitutable goods and that their industries continue to provide 
reasonable returns on capital investment. They further seek to 
support their products in international trade. As such, it is reasonable 
to expect that these states will endeavor to provide continued and 
expanded levels of energy supplies from fossil resources. 
Energy security laws are designed to provide secure sources of 
energy in a world of instability; it is in the nature of such provisional 
planning to plan for redundancy—in short to plan and provide for 
surplus energy supply capacity. The United States has multiple 
strategies that each support divergent energy sourcing options. The 
DOE is charged with energy innovation and reliability and provides 
programmatic incentives to achieve those goals.277 The DOD has 
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distinguishable energy security needs and operates primarily from 
the Defense Production Act; still, the DOD remains committed to a 
variety of energy innovation projects.278 The United States’ broader 
energy agenda, as enunciated by Congress through the tax code, 
provides a hodgepodge of economic incentives to petroleum energy 
resources, new and renewable energy sources, and alternative 
energy sources.279 Given the scale of the programs and incentives, it 
is reasonable to expect that additional energy supplies could result. 
The WTO’s particular support of primary products from lesser-
developed parties is of additional note: that a body ostensibly aiming 
for even and fair trade has taken concern to ensure that lesser-
developed countries are able to export their primary products in a 
manner that leads to their further economic development.280 As 
petroleum is a key primary product for certain lesser developed 
countries, in addition to being a primary export for certain countries, 
the WTO system supports the growth of fossil fuels in a manner that 
it likely would be unable to support new and renewable energy 
supplies sans additional growth in the scope of the WTO. 
Thus, the variety of energy laws reviewed demonstrates that 
their policy goals are to increase levels of energy supplies available 
to the global market and to ensure that those energy supplies are 
affordable to consumers. Additionally, to the extent that the 
consumption of most energy products is path-dependent on the 
installed machine base, energy source alternative will remain 
compatible to current electrical and transportation fuel norms of 
production.281 Thus, if the goals of those legal measures are attained, 
it is reasonably foreseeable that consumers would be presented with 
increased levels of energy supplies, that those energy supplies will 
be competitive goods in character and usage, and that the costs of 
those energy products and services would likely be competitive with 
one another. 
2. International Trade Laws and Market Forces Could Result 
in Higher Consumption 
International trade regimes, as exemplified by the WTO, strive 
to enable idealized conditions for trade: free transit of goods and 
services, tariff free marketing, and the absence of market 
discrimination. Commodities and services can freely enter into a 
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variety of markets; indeed, the concept of a global market is 
correlated with the success of the GATT parties to reach to such a 
high percentage of the world’s states. 
When all other things stay the same,282 additional quantities 
of otherwise “competitive products”283 into a common market 
should result in lower prices if the overall demand function also 
remains unchanged.284 That lower price enables the market to 
clear and to consume all of the products. In this case, the products 
would be the whole mix of energy products, including fossil fuels 
and renewable energy sources. If the market did clear all of the 
energy products placed into it, that clearing would require the 
purchase and expected consumption of the fossil fuel products; 
such consumption would result in greenhouse gas emissions, as 
the fossil fuels are combusted for energy release. 
3. Higher Energy Consumption Could Lead to Increased 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
If only the legal measures that address the support and sustained 
production and future remunerative nature of fossil fuel industries 
are successful in their efforts, the world would likely encounter 
increased quantities of hydrocarbon production, at least for the next 
several decades, or potentially much longer.285 
                                                                                                             
 282. The economic modelling phrase of ceteris paribus is the targeted meaning 
herein. 
 283. The economic parlance would be ‘similarly priced, highly substitutable 
(or close substitutes) goods’ in lieu of ‘competitive goods.’ 
 284. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS, FIFTH EDITION 
(South-Western, 2009), see Table 4, at 82. See also ROBERT H. FRANK, 
MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR, EIGHTH EDITION, 37–41 (2010). In more formal 
terms, see ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, & JERRY R. GREEN, 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1995). The references here are to several popular 
textbooks at the undergraduate and post-graduate level of economics courses. The 
original concept(s) was pioneered by Alfred Marshall, who called it “scissors 
analysis,” building on its previous discovery of “suppy and demand” theory by 
Antoine Augustin Cournot. 
 285. While many might expect that hydrocarbons are running into short 
supply, such is not the actual case. While arguments could be presented that the 
costs to explore and develop crude oil assets are increasing, technology has 
continued to develop, and certain costs of previously unproducible hydrocarbon 
assets have come in recent range. The development of the shale oil industry, 
colloquially refered to as “frack oil,” has dramatically reset the global markets in 
crude oil. Another potential hydrocarbon resource, offshore methane hydrates, 
were only recently the subject of pure research; however, Japanese researchers 
demonstrated the production potential of those resources in 2013. For an in-
depth discussion on the centuries-long potential production profile of offshore 
methane hydrates, see Partain, supra note 272. 




Increased consumption of those fossil fuels could result from 
several scenarios. First, if the global population continues to increase 
its standard of living,286 it will likely have higher demands for energy. 
Second, if the world’s population continues to increase in size, and at 
least maintains its current standard of living, then the additional 
humans would require additional energy consumption. Third, if the 
increased supplies were subject to traditional supply and demand 
analysis, then even when no increases in the demand function were to 
be observed, we would expect the prices of such fuels to drop until 
they were all purchased.287 It is likely that standard of living will 
continue to improve; it is likely that the world’s population will 
continue to increase in count, and it is likely that prices will be 
adjusted to ensure that the products are consumed. 
Green energy innovations might not be sufficient to cure this 
result. First, the creation and production of highly substitutable 
energy sources, biofuels to replace conventional diesel, and solar 
plants to replace coal power plants does not ensure the elimination 
of fossil fuel consumption globally but does reduce the previous 
consumption of those fuels, effectively rendering more fossil fuels 
into the marketplace, i.e., avoiding the consumption of fossil fuels 
effectively increases their supply for other consumers. 
4. Gains in Efficiency Might Not Help 
One might expect gains in energy efficiency to reduce overall 
energy demand by technologically requiring less energy for each task, 
as mandated by the UNFCCC.288 However, gains in energy efficiency 
seldom result in lower levels of energy consumption. The UNFCCC 
and related regulatory efforts encourage the promotion of energy 
efficient technologies as a complement to encouraging renewable and 
carbon-free energy sources.289 The basic concept is that if engines and 
machines needed less energy, then less conventional fossil fuels 
would be consumed. 
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However, as Jevons first wrote nearly two centuries ago, energy 
efficiency does not necessarily lead to a reduction in energy demand 
and may well encourage increased energy demand.290 There are 
several motivations for the traditional Jevons’ Paradox and the related 
theories of “rebound effects.”291 While the economic phenomena 
related to energy efficiency, Jevons’ Paradox, and the potential for 
energy efficiency to increase energy could engage very lengthy 
discussions,292 here is a quick sketch of several known related 
phenomena: 
i. The inelasticity of demand plays a key role; if a market 
is able to absorb all of the energy provided to it at high 
prices, then it will likely absorb greater supplies of energy 
at lower prices. 
ii. Efficiency gains can create a virtual increase in supply. 
Considered from a unitized perspective:293 assume a task 
originally took two parts of energy to complete and then 
was made more efficient to require only one part of energy; 
although the overall supply of energy was left unchanged, 
the user of the machine will observe twice as much supply 
vis-à-vis his operational needs. From the perspective of the 
consumer, energy efficiency would make the supply of 
energy appear increased. 
iii. Reducing the necessary energy for any particular task 
brings that task in range of more numerous populated but 
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smaller energy budgets; energy efficiency puts more tasks in 
range of more people.294 By enabling more people to 
consume energy, it is possible that energy efficiency can 
lead to additional economic activity and potentially 
economic growth.295 
Lower prices, increases in effective supply, and reduced scale of 
energy needs per activity all could lead to sustained or higher 
levels of energy consumption. Higher energy consumption could 
lead to higher levels of greenhouse gas emissions. 
CONCLUSION 
BETTER CHOICES IN INNOVATION: THE STONE AGE DID NOT END 
FOR LACK OF STONE296 
Thus, in the present situation, without some form of change in 
law and legal conventions, the world is faced with the imminent 
possibility of increased greenhouse gas emissions as additional 
energy supplies from both fossil fuels and new and renewable 
energy sources respond to the incentive to innovate. There are 
several ways to prevent this from happening. 
First, the existing laws and legal conventions could be altered, and 
such efforts are indeed in progress. The UN hopes for a major update 
to the UNFCCC in 2015 at what is tentatively referred to as Paris 
2015.297 However, it is already some three plus decades since the 
international legal negotiations have been underway, starting with the 
original talks that led to the UNFCCC itself. Major economies have 
recently reduced their engagement with certain UNFCCC/Kyoto 
targets, namely Australia and Canada. Another major economy, the 
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United States, never joined in the Kyoto obligations.298 The world 
remains without a united governance paradigm to achieve global 
reductions in greenhouse gases. 
Second, failing to achieve coordinated measures, governments 
might attempt unilateral movements in domestic legal measures to 
try to cobble together movement towards reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions. Such efforts have been undertaken, indeed much of 
the green policies in place—certainly those of the United States—
have been undertaken from such a perspective. However, any effort 
to provide incentives for green energy innovation sans other acts of 
energy law coordination merely adds to global energy supplies as 
discussed in this article299 and perhaps enables international carbon 
leakage problems.300 
Third, the general public could be persuaded to shift their 
priorities and consumption preferences to create stronger market 
demand for new and renewable energy products. An example of 
such an effort is Al Gore’s slideshow cum book cum movie “An 
Inconvenient Truth” and its worldwide media coverage, which 
ensured that most people today are aware to some extent of the 
issues.301 However, as green energy products are designed as close 
substitutes for traditional energy products, their consumption might 
merely relocate the consumption of fossil fuels to those consumers 
either unaware or indifferent to the concerns of climate change, and 
indeed, some might be prioritizing purchases of green energy 
products; but nowhere are fossil fuels abandoned, nowhere are there 
piles of fuel abandoned for use.302 
                                                                                                             
 298. At the time of writing in early November 2014, the Republican Party had 
just gained control of Congress, both the House and the Senate. Such control will 
likely limit the ability of the Obama Administration to overtly agree to the Paris 
2015 agreements. For more on the limits of the American government to agree to 
international climate accords, see Roy A. Partain & Sanghyun Lee, Article 20 
Obligations under the KORUS FTA: The Deteriorating Environment for Climate 
Change Legislation in the U.S., 24 AM. CONST. STUD. 441 (2013). 
 299. See supra Part V. 
 300. For a discussion on international carbon leakage, see Partain, Green 
Paradox Spectre, supra note 3. 
 301. See AL GORE, AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH: THE PLANETARY EMERGENCY OF 
GLOBAL WARMING AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2006). See also Kakutani’s 
review of the book, Michiko Kakutani, Al Gore Revisits Global Warming, With 
Passionate Warnings and Pictures, N.Y TIMES (May 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2006/05/23/books/23kaku.html?pagewanted=all&_r=, archived at http://perma 
.cc/8V6B-5BX5. 
 302. Perhaps recent price adjusts to oil, as of November 2014, reflect increased 
supplies on the market, but still, the market appears to be clearing at the lower prices. 
Details on the potential for oil prices to drop much further and remain above their 
marginal costs of production are discussed in Partain, supra note 3, at Part III. 




So the best answer, barring global legal solutions at the 2015 Paris 
convention, is hidden in that simple term of “perfect substitutes.” As 
long as the green energy innovations are designed and implemented 
as mere substitutes, they will not be effective at eliminating fossil 
fuels from the marketplace, but will merely enable the continued 
means of fuel and energy delivery. As long as the systems remain 
similar, and as long as the relevant parties remain engaged in 
maintaining and sustaining price competitiveness, the price of fossil 
fuels will only face pressure to drop and thus become available for a 
greater range of consumption options. Perfect substitutes lead to 
competition, which can only be won on pricing, ceteris paribus. 
Ergo, the innovations that are needed are either those innovations 
that so transform the cost structure of new and renewable energy 
sources as to make them consistently preferable to the substantial 
totality of global customers, and those innovations that make the 
character of new and renewable energy sources so sufficiently 
superior that few would want to consume fossil fuels. 
Instead of simply attempting to encourage all new and renewable 
energy alternatives, energy policies that encourage innovation should 
be focused on these two agendas: (i) dominant cost superiority and 
(ii) dominant energy character. More energy, more readily accessed, 
at lower costs, all while providing superior environmental and climate 
protection. 
Focusing on those policies that seek to squeeze fossil energy out 
from one area will only encourage its consumption elsewhere. 
Policies that attempt to deny the property rights of those that currently 
own and derive their livelihoods from those resources is also ethically 
and practically fraught with complexity and other hazards.303 New 
technologies that accomplish the task better and at cheaper costs 
displace the old technologies. The world needs those innovations in 
energy; legal measures to suppress fossil fuels likely will not work. 
Does the world need an era of fossil fuel prohibitionism? Or, 
should the world seek better choices? The answer lies in better 
choices. Selective innovation should be the goal of future energy 
policies. 
  
                                                                                                             
 303. Sinn was very concerned with this topic of property rights and their impact 
on accelerated depletion rates. See Partain, Green Paradox Spectre, supra note 3. 
 
 
